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Naturalist Inquiry and Grounded Theory 
Barney G. Glaser ∗ 
Abstract: The world of Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) 
methodology became quite taken with LINCOLN and 
GUBA’s book “Naturalist Inquiry” (1985). I have no issue 
with it with respect to its application to QDA; it helped clar-
ify and advance so many QDA issues. However, its applica-
tion to Grounded Theory (GT) has been a major block on 
GT, as originated, by its cooptation and corruption hence 
remodeling of GT by default. LINCOLN and GUBA have 
simply assumed GT is just another QDA method, which it is 
not. In “The Grounded Theory Perspective II” (GLASER 
2003, Chapter 9 on credibility), I have discussed “Naturalist 
Inquiry” (NI) thought regarding how LINCOLN and 
GUBA’s notion of “trustworthy” data (or worrisome data 
orientation) and how their view of constant comparison can 
and has remodeled and eroded GT. In this paper I will con-
sider other aspects of NI that remodel GT. 
1. What is Truth? 
“Naturalist Inquiry” (NI) deals with a fundamental problem: “the concept of 
truth” (LINCOLN & GUBA 1985, Chapter 1). LINCOLN and GUBA formu-
late truth as “a systematic set of beliefs, together with their accompanying 
methods, a paradigm.” They say, “a paradigm is a world view” which produces 
a methodology that arrives at a current set of beliefs. As such a paradigm ar-
rives at a current truth! Then LINCOLN and GUBA take paradigm use very 
eruditely through three “paradigm eras, (pre-positivist, positivist, and post-
positivist) periods in which certain sets of beliefs guided inquiry in quite differ-
ent ways.” They say “that if a new paradigm of thought and belief is emerging, 
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it is necessary to construct a parallel new paradigm of inquiry.” Each paradigm 
as it emerges comes to “true understanding” and to “ultimate truth.” LINCOLN 
and GUBA assert that their book is in the third paradigm, post-positivism, in an 
“effort to mark out (their) place along the path to understanding.” And as 
“theories are remarkably immune to change,” thus “any conflicting fact can be 
accommodated by making adjustments. As paradigms are assaulted by facts 
that do not fit, the facts can be walled off.” This, of course, opposes Grounded 
Theory (GT) methodology, which compares all facts to conceptualize a place in 
the emerging theory. (The quotes in this paragraph come from Chapter 1, 
pp.15-31.)  
Being drawn into this discussion of arriving at facts by changing methodol-
ogy simply remodels GT, particularly from the naturalist post-positivist view 
which asserts the reverse of positivism, that is constructivism, regarding arriv-
ing at “relative” truths or facts. The reader can easily read their discussion. But 
this discussion, however it may be relevant to Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) 
as it evolves into constructivism, is not applicable, even relevant to GT (see 
GLASER 2002).  
First, LINCOLN and GUBA’s (1985) discussion’s underlying pattern sim-
ply focuses on changing views of worrisome accuracy, but always accuracy. It 
does not address the abstract nature of GT, which does not deal in facts or 
findings, but generates concepts that apply as explanations. The concepts are 
not facts, as I have reiterated over and over. They are variables that vary and 
are modifiable. They are integrated into a theory, which results in interrelated 
categories and their properties, highly applicable but not factual.  
Second, GT does not generate an immune theory – immune to facts, which 
is, of course, a major problem of received theory. GT is inducted from system-
atically collected facts, which in the process for generating GT from data, con-
stantly verifies its fit, relevance and workability, and adjusts (modifies the 
concepts and their relationships) the theory to the facts to achieve fit, relevance 
and workability. New facts are not “walled off.” They are compared into the 
GT to generate concepts. Thus a GT can be generated with whatever the para-
digm and the methodology for achieving it, as “all is data” about whatever is 
going on (see GLASER 1998). GT is a flexible, conceptual, inductive method-
ology abstract of LINCOLN and GUBA’s (1985) discussion on finding the 
right truth, belief, to wit their focus on worrisome accuracy. GT generates 
concepts from systematically collected data, as opposed to LINCOLN and 
GUBA’s position that post-positivism generates descriptive facts that are ef-
fected by the way extant theory allows the researcher to see them.  
“Meanings are determined by theory, they are understood by theoretical co-
herence rather than by facts,” LINCOLN and GUBA (1985) say quoting 
HABERMAS (LINCOLN & GUBA 1985, p.36). In contrast, GT generates 
theory, say processes, ranges or binaries, that may have very different mean-
ings to varied people. For example the meaning of pseudo-friending as a 
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mechanism of client control, will have varied meanings to clients – such as 
toning, sounding phony, turning off, easing the tension, irresistible, sweet talk-
ing, making comfortable, etc, but whatever the meaning, pseudo-friending goes 
on (see GUTHRIE 2000).  
GT abandons the falseness of theoretical coherence as establishing and 
blessing theory rather than grounding it in data. Ungrounded theoretical coher-
ence is just a scholarly way of saying logical conjecture uncontrolled by facts is 
always neat and tidy given the good minds doing it. But it hardly means that 
the conjecture has any relationship to what is going on, and most often does 
not! This lack of relationship to the real world as is, this forcing the real world 
as one wants it to be, leads to making GT appear as a waste of time and a sub-
terfuge, if one wants to use prior extant theory. LINCOLN and GUBA’s (1985) 
erudite scholarship, quoting great thinkers, by which they put over their post-
positivist naturalist paradigm will not get by the grounded theorist, however 
overwhelming the bow to idols. He/she has to discover what is going on: what-
ever it is but without preconception. At core in LINCOLN and GUBA’s dis-
cussion is just another new set of ungrounded logical conjectures on “what 
truth is” which is moot and irrelevant to GT conceptions and should not be 
allowed to remodel it as another QDA. Let the QDA methodologist wrestle 
with the post-positivist paradigm.  
2. Axioms 
To firmly found their “naturalist paradigm,” LINCOLN and GUBA state its 
axioms (LINCOLN & GUBA 1985, pp.36-38). They define axioms “as the set 
of undemonstrated (and undemonstratable) ‘basic beliefs’ accepted by conven-
tion or established by practice as the building blocks of some conceptual or 
theoretical structure or system” (p.33). In short these axioms are ungrounded 
by their words, so are of no use to GT. Yet LINCOLN and GUBA build a 
naturalist paradigm on these ungrounded conjectures. That is just plain forcing 
the research model and the data, which GT will have no part of.  
Of course, the axioms, like all idealism, sound good and wise, but are (to re-
peat) ungrounded conjectures. They are LINCOLN and GUBA say:  
realities which are multiple, constructed and holistic, knower and known are 
interactive, inseparable: only time and context bound working hypotheses are 
possible; all entities are in a state of mutual simultaneous shaping, so that it is 
impossible to distinguish causes from effects; inquiry is value-bound (p.37).  
These axiomatic beliefs are just think-ups, ungrounded in research, but hon-
oring idols (critical theorists) that LINCOLN and GUBA are enamored by. 
They are of no use to GT. GT is just focused on conceptualizing what emerges. 
If these axioms emerge, fine; if they do not, fine. They cannot be used to force 
the data as some kind of inalienable laws. GT has left this forcing behind. 
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Naturalist inquiry cannot be allowed to regress and default remodel GT back to 
what it was trying to correct.  
Incidentally the fourth axiom on mutual simultaneous shaping may be get-
ting at a theoretical code that may emerge: that is the random walk model. But  
LINCOLN and GUBA are very unformulated on this theoretical code that is 
well-known in hard science inquiries. LINCOLN and GUBA cite fourteen 
characteristics of operational naturalistic inquiry based on these axioms (pp.39-
43, op.cit.). These characteristics compound the conjecturing as oughts or forc-
ings to happen during research. Some are trite, some are just obvious or routine 
and some are supposedly borrowed from GT. I will go through them, but the 
reader should keep in mind their preconceived pacing and forcing nature and 
that a GT researcher just does GT according to whatever emerges as data, as 
pacing, as substantive codes, as theoretical codes in a substantive area. LIN-
COLN and GUBA’s characteristics restrict the flexibility and autonomy of the 
researcher to discover GT and should not be allowed to remodel GT to another 
QDA.  
1) Natural setting: “In naturalist settings, realities are wholes that cannot be 
understood in isolation from their contexts” (p.39). I have said in many of 
my writings that theoretical codes, like context, must emerge as relevant: 
earn their relevance (see e.g. GLASER 1998). They cannot be assumed or 
forced. I have seen many grounded theories that do not have context as a 
theoretical code and they are not lacking. “Wholes” also force the data. 
Whether or not the conceptions or categories depict “wholes” or dimen-
sions of “wholes” is also emergent relative to the core variable and its re-
solving the main concern. “Wholes” is a pure QDA descriptive rule.  
2) Human instrument: NI  
elects to use him/herself as well as others as the primary data gathering in-
strument. Human instrument is capable of grasping and evaluating the mean-
ing of differential interaction. All instruments are value based and interact 
with local values, but only the human being is in a position to identify and 
take into account these resulting biases (pp.39-40).  
This characteristic is trite; we all know this. However it implies only 
qualitative analysis is done, which is ok for QDA, but not for GT. GT uses all 
as data, quantitative and qualitative, and often differential meanings and 
values biases are of no relevance, and if so they are just more data. It depends 
on what data is used in what combination and what emerges. Thus GT should 
not be remodeled into thinking that humans as instruments, differential 
meanings and value biases ARE ALWAYS an issue. Let us see first, and not 
force these issues.  
3) Utilization of tacit knowledge: Here LINCOLN and GUBA legitimate what 
in their view is subjective: nuances, intuition and feelings, as opposed to 
language expressed data, because tacit knowledge mirrors the interaction, 
multiple realties and value patterns of the researcher. For GT when relevant 
 118
these are just more variables, but only when they earn their relevancy into a 
grounded theory. So ok, but emergent and not always. They are NOT to be 
forced by examinations when not relevant. And once made relevant they 
are as much a manifest data for category generation as any other. They are 
not tacit! We see here, in this characteristic, the beginnings of the construc-
tivist approach of LINCOLN and GUBA.  
4) Qualitative methods: “[NI] uses qualitative over quantitative methods be-
cause they are more adaptable to dealing with multiple realties” (p.40) and 
the effect of researcher posture and values on data collected. This is trite 
and redundant for QDA researchers who are committed to qualitative data. 
This is moot for GT because of its abstracting the data to conceptual cate-
gories on whatever is emerging.  
5) Purposive sampling: “[NI] is likely to eschew random or representative 
sampling in favor of purposive or theoretical sampling because he or she 
thereby increases the scope or range of data exposed” (p.40). LINCOLN 
and GUBA say that purposive sample is an effort to uncover multiple real-
ties, local conditions, local mutual shapings and local values in order to de-
vise grounded theory. This is a classic example of borrowing GT jargon to 
put over a QDA method approach and one that forces the search for specific 
descriptions: multiple realities, and local conditions, shapings and values. 
Their search is for required, preconceived grounded descriptions, not emer-
gent conceptual theory. Their impact is to remodel GT to a QDA method.  
6) Inductive data analysis: “[NI] prefers inductive to deductive data analysis 
because that process is more likely to identify” (p.40) their preconceived, 
required descriptions cited above in 5. LINCOLN and GUBA continue that 
induction is “more likely to describe fully the setting and to make decisions 
about transferability to other settings easier” (p.40). Here they clearly are 
descriptive, not conceptual, oriented. And they conceive of generalizing as 
transferring descriptions from one unit to another unit. This does not apply 
to GT, which engages in conceptual generalizing (see GLASER 2001).  
7) Grounded theory: “[NI] prefers to have the guiding substantive theory 
emerge from the data because no a priori theory could possible encompass” 
(p.41) the preconceived required description cited above in 5. Once again 
GT is jargonized to be applied to grounded descriptions of investigator val-
ues, contextual values, multiple realities, and their other descriptive con-
cerns. This use of the word GT has nothing to do with conceptual GT as 
originated, BUT has had a large remodeling effect in QDA research. It tries 
to establish grounded description as GT, when it is rather the opposite. Also 
they do not refer to any procedures upon which GT as description is gener-
ated.  
8) Emergent design: “[NI] elects to allow the research design to emerge rather 
than to construct it preordinately because it is inconceivable that enough 
could be known ahead of time” (p.41) about their preconceived, require de-
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scriptions cited in 5. This is, of course, the spirit and approach of pure GT, 
BUT of course, a jargonized use for descriptions not GT. LINCOLN and 
GUBA again borrow GT jargon, not substance. GT lets whatever emerge as 
data and then is conceptualized into categories. GT does NOT seek a spe-
cial emergent, as LINCOLN and GUBA wish, to force to get, say: a trust-
worthy multiple reality or local value.  
9) Negotiated outcomes:  
[NI] prefers to negotiate meaning and interpretation with human sources 
from which the data have chiefly been drawn because it is their constructions 
of reality that the inquirer seeks to reconstruct because inquiry outcomes de-
pend upon the nature and quality of the interaction between knower and the 
known (p.41). 
This, of course refers to LINCOLN and GUBA’s (1985) constructivist 
orientation, which I analyzed in the above citation. Constructionism is NOT 
GT, but could emerge in a small amount of cases as just more categories. 
LINCOLN and GUBA’s constructivist orientation applies in their case to 
accurate description, not the conceptualizations of GT.  
10) Case study reporting mode: “[NI] is likely to prefer the case study reporting 
mode because it is more adapted to a description of” (pp.41-42) the precon-
ceived, required descriptions cited in 5. It flies in the face of theoretical 
sampling as a pure GT procedure where many cases can be sampled. And 
also their affirmation seems to conflict with their notion of purposive sam-
pling as stated in 5 above. This characteristic is trite for QDA researchers 
and GT researchers. It is what they do anyway. 
How this case focus “provides the focus for both individual naturalist 
generalization and transferability to other sites” (p.41) is irrelevant for GT 
conceptual generalizations and a difficult task for descriptive genera-
lization between units.  
11) Idiographic interpretation: “[NI] is inclined to interpret data idiographi-
cally in terms of the particulars of case rather than nomothetically in terms 
of lawlike generalizations because different interpretations are likely to be 
meaningful for” (p.42) their preconceived, required descriptions cited in 5 
above. This statement is irrelevant for GT conceptions, unless LINCOLN 
and GUBA consider “lawlike generalization” (p.42) as a synonym for con-
ceptualization. Then it once again remodels GT to a QDA method for de-
scription. I will let the QDA methodologist worry about the obtuse meaning 
in 11, unless, again, it just resolves to constructivist thought. If so see my 
paper of constructivism cited above (GLASER 2002).  
12) Tentative application: “[NI] is likely to be tentative (hesitant) about making 
broad application of the findings because realities are multiple and differ-
ent, because finding are to some extent dependent upon the particular inter-
action between investigator and respondents ...” (p.42). Here we have the 
descriptive generalization problem (see GLASER 2001, Chapter 7), which 
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is a description about one unit be applied (same as generalization) to an-
other unit. Transferability is a big QDA problem, oft debated. This has 
nothing to do with pure GT, which generalizes concepts, e.g. the study of 
client control in a veterinarian hospital applies to any area where client con-
trol exists – always with some modification by constant comparison if nec-
essary. QDA methodologists seem to not understand this difference in gen-
eralization and hence their difficult non-concise generalizing arguments 
compared to the ease of GT generalizing.  
13) Focused determined boundaries: “[NI] is likely to set boundaries to the 
inquiry on the basis of the emergent focus because that permits the multiple 
realities, etc., to define the focus because focus setting can be more closely 
mediated by the investigator-focus interaction etc.” (p.42).This sounds 
emergent, but is actually not. Boundaries are set by achieving the precon-
ceived required descriptions cited in 5, which is a forced resolution to the 
research. This is diametrically opposed to the boundaries of pure GT, which 
are based on emergent theoretical saturation, constant delimiting, selective 
coding, theoretical sampling, core variable analysis, analytic rules and theo-
retical completeness. In short GT boundaries are based on emergence from 
the procedures of generating, in contrast to NI’s approach to gathering de-
scriptions on the preconceived items cited in 5 as boundary making.  
14) Special criteria for trustworthiness: “[NI] is likely to find the conventional 
trustworthiness criteria (internal and external validity, reliability and objec-
tivity) inconsistent with the axioms and procedures of naturalistic inquiry” 
(pp.42-43). I have dealt with LINCOLN and GUBA’s view of credibility at 
length in “The Grounded Theory Perspective II” (GLASER 2003, Chapter 
9). In short it does not apply to GT, and should not be allowed to remodel 
GT.  
In sum, these characteristics of NI based on its axioms provide the foundation 
for their fuller elaboration in the remaining chapters of the NI-book. They are 
quite genuine for NI as a QDA method, HOWEVER when allowed, at points, 
to sweep GT into them as a QDA method, they unmercifully remodel GT. The 
result is that GT as an abstract conceptualizing method to generate theory is 
lost – totally lost. And further GT becomes subject to all the criteria for achiev-
ing worrisome accuracy of description, which do not apply, but have grave 
remodeling effects on GT.  
3. More Details 
These 14 characteristics are actually for experienced QDA methodologists 
rather simple, redundant and trite. They have been faced constantly in QDA 
research and methodology writings and in worrisome accuracy problems long 
before LINCOLN and GUBA wrote them up (see for example the extensive 
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reference list, pp.318 to 330, in MILES & HUBERMAN 1994). LINCOLN and 
GUBA elaborate on them at great length in a scholarly way in the remaining 
chapters of their book. I intend to skip and dip in these chapters to show yet 
again where GT is remodeled unmercifully by their QDA orientation.  
Of course, I cannot analyze the remodeling of GT in each page of each 
chapter or this paper would itself become a book. I intend to give the idea of 
the style of remodeling conducted by GUBA and LINCOLN: a fractured style 
of multiple requirements at each moment in the research that is diametrically 
opposed to the autonomous flexibility of GT procedures to allow maximum 
emergence. LINCOLN and GUBA’s apparent openness to the methods of 
emergence and to grounding is shut down constantly with the overwhelming 
multiple requirements of control.  
The blocking of details will not be new to the reader. They will just be more 
grounded so the latent remodeling of GT pattern will leave few doubts. This 
will help GT researchers, who wish not to get swept up by naturalist inquiry 
and wish to handle the discussion with those researchers for whom NI is the 
path. Remember, as worthy a QDA method as NI is, it should not be allowed to 
co-opt and corrupt GT as originated. It should not borrow GT jargon and rheto-
ric to legitimate its very different procedures.  
3.1 Paradigms 
Harkening back to the beginning of this paper, the way people think is the way 
they want to know – a paradigm. It is the way they in which wish to make 
sense, to analyze. It is their worldview and normative “taken for granted” con-
trol of action. It is their unquestioned assumptions about life. A paradigm needs 
a methodology to arrive at “scientific” data. NI methodology, which provides  
LINCOLN and GUBA their science, contrasted with GT methodology is just 
quite different. It should not remodel GT as better or best.  
NI wishes accurate description of the action regarding knowing and GT 
wants conceptualization of fundamental latent patterns occurring in the action. 
Their respective methodologies are different and result in different levels of 
abstraction. NI’s methodology has a built-in, taken for granted, unquestioned 
assumptions many of which are directly linked to positivism, whatever their 
claims to a post-positive methodology. They are descriptive properties, the 
prime one being worrisome accuracy of descriptive findings. Another is the 
difficulty of unit generalization, because finding enough similarity between 
studied unit and another unit to generalize to is a troublesome task. Multiple 
realities, interaction-interpretation data and context feed into specifying accu-
racy and so do member checking and auditing. Value free in description is a 
problem no matter what the descriptive paradigm.  
NI’s approach to these descriptive issues are all inimical to the GT para-
digm, it deals in concepts abstract of description’s of time, place and people 
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and therefore it produces conceptual hypotheses. GT methodology stands on it 
own as a way to generate conceptual theory, or as a way of thinking conceptu-
ally. Thus applying NI to GT is remodeling and a takeover coming from as-
suming GT is a QDA method. Arguments over which paradigm to use and its 
methodology is useless. Neither fails, they are just different in their pursuit of 
different products. A merger between them will inevitably remodel GT as NI is 
a very popular ascendant QDA methodology.  
Even as it tries to correct, the positivist grab of NI is shackling even though 
it claims post-positivism. It is deeply involved in credibility or trustworthiness 
– worrisome accuracy – objectivity and value free data problem and gener-
alizability. It complies with positivism just to get to the “facts.” The writing of 
NI is tight details, bogged down in endless scholarship with no conceptual 
mastery. NI methodology is descriptive capture to the maximum as it quests its 
own legitimization.  
GT legitimization stands on its own as grounded categories generated from 
data that it explains, not describes. It is an abstract of the rhetorical wrestles of 
NI in pursuit of establishing the credibility of its descriptive accuracy. GT is 
detachable from the data that it was generated from; it endures as conceptually 
general long after the collected data is stale from change. NI, of course, in its 
quest for accuracy is not detachable from the data it is describing and soon the 
description becomes stale.  
Conceptual meaning of GT comes from the discovered latent patterns and 
pattern maintenance as the theory gets built up to a multivariate theory. The GT 
conceptual meanings persist and then perhaps are modified when the data 
changes or gets stale. NI meanings come from description of joint researcher-
participants interactions and interpretations and change if they can keep up 
with descriptive changes. But usually they become stale with the data. This 
puts pressure on finishing a NI descriptive dissertation before the growing stale 
problem occurs. GT, of course, endures virtually forever and does not force 
premature finishing of a dissertation or research manuscript. Furthermore the 
generality of NI units is potentially a highly stale situation, whereas GT gener-
ality of concepts endures forever.  
The preempting progression of NI description from pre-positivism through 
positivism to post-positivism seems controversial for GT when it is kept con-
ceptual and not remodeled to a QDA method. Paradigm changes in researchers 
are slow and almost imperceptible. Therefore the novice is more open to the 
learning the GT paradigm for quickly taking it on and rigorously applying it in 
research. It is hard for those previously trained in QDA to change their para-
digm from a QDA orientation to a GT orientation, because the skill levels and 
the latent learning curves are so different: descriptive skill procedures con-
trasted with ability to use conceptualizing procedures. NI remodeling GT, 
again, is a great loss to the latter.  
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3.2 Research design 
LINCOLN and GUBA assert from the start of their book “what it means to 
design an NI study in view of our insistence that the design cannot be given a 
priori, but must emerge as the study proceeds” (p.225). This certainly sounds 
like the GT approach, but sounding is as far as its goes before the clamp down 
(forcing) for trustworthy description becomes their concern. They suggest ten 
design elements that would clearly derail a pure GT. They are as follows: 
1) “Determining a focus for the inquiry”: This appears at first glance that they 
suggest having a substantive area in focus as in pure GT. But no they intend 
to not let a problem emerge. They assert that no inquiry can be conducted 
in the absence of a focus. For LINCOLN and GUBA the focus is on a pro-
fessional problem, or an evaluation or policy. This is an a priori focus. 
Whereas in GT the problem emerges (see GLASER 1998, Chapter 8). 
Determining a problem on an a priori focus provides for a NI inquiry (1) the 
boundaries of the study or the proper terrain of the inquiry and (2) determines 
the inclusion-exclusion criteria for new data. Of course, GT boundary and 
inclusions are emergent solely on theoretical saturation of categories and their 
properties, and delimiting tactics for data collection – theoretical sampling 
and data analysis, theoretical completeness, memo bank saturations, open to 
selective coding, etc. These GT procedures tap emergence. The LINCOLN 
and GUBA NI focus forces a priori boundaries. Remember that GT is 
emergently bounded and the data is bounded by the generated theory. A QDA 
description, like that from NI, can be endless without forcing bounding 
criteria which are required to judge an end to the research which is 
paradoxically called full description. GT emergent boundaries are built on 
relevance and fit, while NI boundaries, being arbitrary, easily give descriptive 
non-valence data, however much the human or professional interest. For GT, 
data inclusion is always emergent as theoretical sampling continues for the 
emergent categories. To buy into the a priori NI focus would severely block 
pure GT.  
2) “Determining fit of paradigm to focus”: According to LINCOLN and 
GUBA the paradigm has axioms, or basic beliefs, and they must be adhered 
to in the focus of a research. If NI is the paradigm of choice, they say, the 
initial design should reflect consideration of the axioms. This is quite an 
order for a researcher to keep in mind. It imposes a complex ideology to 
implement at the same time as the inquiry proceeds. Compared to GT, this 
is an inordinate non-grounded forcing of the research, if the reader can re-
member the fourteen axioms cited above. GT’s axiom is simple: let’s see 
what is going on and it’s, “whatever emerges.”  
For example, LINCOLN and GUBA say: “First, is the phenomenon 
something about which respondents are not likely to be forthcoming” (p.229). 
Or can we trust the respondents to tell it like it is, so we get NI. This is 
irrelevant for GT, it is what is emerging – properline data – and it resolves 
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the respondents’ “conflict in interests” if there is even a conflict. “Half-truths 
or falsehoods that respondents supply,” “suspect of deception, lies or fronts 
may characterize an inquiry scene” (p.231) and these bother LINCOLN and 
GUBA. They compromise their worrisome accuracy or in their terms 
“trustworthiness.” For GT this is excellent data on what is going on e.g. 
organizational cover-ups or automobile sales. 
The occurrence of conditional constraints that block NI, like untoward 
standards of an audience or committee, are just more data for GT on what is 
going on. The latent control becomes a category in the more comprehensive 
generated theory.  
3) “Determining the fit of inquiry paradigm to the substantive theory selected 
to guide the inquiry”: This is only okay for GT when using a substantive 
GT with emergent fit to the new data, not to a paradigm. NI can go either 
way: using an extant theory or letting one emerge. The extant theory can be 
a GT or just a forced one. LINCOLN and GUBA say “it is important to as-
sess the degree of fit between paradigm and substantive theory” (p.232). Fit 
to a paradigm, not to the data, legitimates received theory application a pri-
ori. This is clearly inimical to GT. Even a GT that does not have emergent 
fit to the new data can be characterized as a forcing theory even though it 
fits the GT paradigm.  
4) “Determining where and from whom data will be collected”: NI identifies 
the phenomenal group wished to be studied and then it goes for descriptive 
redundancy – informational isomorph – or getting new information reaches 
diminishing returns. Again GT is not bounded by such criteria. GT goes for 
theoretical conceptual saturation of categories not redundancy and theoreti-
cal sampling goes for site spreading (see GLASER 1998, Chapter 10, op 
cit) once the initial site for research is saturated.  
5) “Determining successive phases of the inquiry”: NI has three phases: “ori-
entation and overview,” “focused exploration” and the “member check.” 
There are significant overlaps between these phases. One can be doing one 
at the same time as the other, while providing a timeline for each. GT pro-
cedures are not phased as such. GT procedures are cycled and go on simul-
taneously, sequentially, subsequently, serendipitously and scheduled when 
possible. This phasing emerges with the theory as it drives the research. For 
example, some researchers discover the core category at the beginning and 
go directly to selective coding and some do not discover it until much later 
in the research after much theoretical sampling, saturation and memoing.  
6) “Determining instrumentation”: LINCOLN and GUBA say “the instrument 
of choice is the human. The human is the initial and continuing mainstay” 
(p.236). The human may be one or a team of persons. Composing teams 
and then their continual training for improvement is an issue for LINCOLN 
and GUBA. For GT, whatever instruments that bring results are used; and 
they are always used by the researcher, who is human. So what LINCOLN 
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and GUBA are saying goes without saying, but with flexibility for GT. 
What is clear also is that the constant perfecting of human instruments by 
supervision and mutual scrutiny by equals for LINCOLN and GUBA is a 
constraining, stifling condition for GT flexibility. 
Perfecting human instruments also is part of the LINCOLN and GUBA’s 
driving quest for trustworthiness demanded by them, which is not relevant for 
GT conceptualizations. Tight control over their human instruments sounds 
too bureaucratic and stultifying for GT discovery. It is in stark contrast to the 
autonomy given to the GT researcher, who is not characterized as an 
instrument, but as just a researcher interested in generating a substantive 
theory. This talk about “instrument” sounds very positivistic to be a view of 
credibility. LINCOLN and GUBA say “the human instrument provides an 
easy way to obtain member checks to make apparently non-credible data 
credible” (pp.239-240). These problems of worrisome accuracy do not apply 
to GT conceptualization.  
7) “Planning data collection and recording”: LINCOLN and GUBA agree to 
all forms of data collection and focus on fidelity and structure. While they 
like the fidelity of taping and video, they see the benefit, as in GT, of the 
non-threatening and selective nature of field notes. But they have a purpose 
for description, not conceptualization, so their view of field notes tends to 
the accuracy idea, not latent pattern discovery.  
Regarding the structure, though LINCOLN and GUBA start with open 
interviews they wish to get to constructing “detailed and specific interview 
and observational protocols, so they can check off pre-structured responses” 
(p.240). In contrast, GT theoretical sampling varies constantly in openness 
and some light structure is there to help theoretically conceptual saturation, 
only to open up again as other categories are pursued. This is part of the 
constant cycling of the research as memos are built up and matured.  
8) “Planning data analysis procedures”: LINCOLN and GUBA say that “data 
analysis will be carried out in an open-ended way following the steps called 
in the ‘constant comparative method’ ” (p.241). I reviewed their remodel of 
the constant comparative method in a paper (see GLASER 2003, Chapter 
10, op cit.). They compare for description purposes using negatives; they do 
not compare to conceptualize whatever emerges as in GT. They are consis-
tent with GT in their suggestion that NI begins with the very first data col-
lection.  
9) “Planning for logistics – the project as a whole, field excursions both prior 
to entering and while in the field, following activities, and closure and ter-
mination” (p.242). This section deals in heavy detail with schedules, 
budget, policy boards, peer debriefing, external audit. The reader can see 
that LINCOLN and GUBA require that oversight again is tight control and 
stifling in the name of trustworthiness. This may be contrasted to GT re-
search in which casual development and progress based on emergence is 
 126
designed into the flexibility, on sight judgment and autonomy of a GT re-
searcher or research team.  
10) “Planning for trustworthiness”: The major issue for LINCOLN and GUBA 
is trustworthiness. In the preface they state: “Chapter 11 raises the thorny 
issue of trustworthiness. Why should the reader of an inquiry report believe 
what is said there?” On page 287, LINCOLN and GUBA introduce Chapter 
11 (after much beating up the issue at every turn before this page) with the 
following paragraph: 
All the while the naturalist must be concern with trustworthiness. In the final 
analysis, the study is for naught if it trustworthiness is questionable. Activi-
ties such as maintaining field journals, mounting safeguards against common 
distortions, arranging for on-site team interactions, triangulating data gather 
referential adequacy materials, doing debriefings, and developing and main-
taining an audit trail are all directed either to increasing the probability that 
trustworthiness will result or to making it possible to assess the degree of 
trustworthiness after the fact. 
At the beginning of Chapter 11 LINCOLN and GUBA described their dreaded 
fear – accusations of untrustworthiness: “the naturalist inquiry soon becomes 
accustomed to hearing charges that naturalist studies are undisciplined: that he 
or she is guilty of ‘sloppy’ research, engaging in ‘merely subjective’ observa-
tions, responding indiscriminately to the ‘loudest bangs or brightest lights’ “ 
(p.289). The reader can read this extensive detailed chapter on how to establish 
1. truth value, 2. applicability, 3. consistency and 4. neutrality. The synonyms 
for trustworthiness abound unmercifully and incessantly on how to achieve this 
desired “objective” trustworthiness.  
LINCOLN and GUBA say at the end of Chapter 11: “The techniques dis-
cussed in the preceding pages apply specifically to the establishment of credi-
bility, transferability, dependability and confirmability” (p.327). As an after-
thought they add in even three more trustworthy making techniques. The 
techniques vary on the odious harassment of routine QDA researchers, if they 
care to follow them.  
I will let the QDA methodologists take on LINCOLN and GUBA, as well 
they might to save the credibility of qualitative description from this worrisome 
accuracy onslaught by these doubt sewers of honest researchers and their best 
efforts. Here we return to the purpose of this article, which is to show the re-
modeling of GT by QDA approaches, so as to extricate it from the ascendant 
QDA methodology. LINCOLN and GUBA have no sense of what data really 
is; they still buy positivist objectivity and therefore are so worried about accu-
racy. Their preface statement and subsequent assertions on trustworthiness are 
sociologically and simply naïve! First socially structured vested fictions run the 
world. If the reader doubts this, he/she should take on his/her local structures 
fictions with truth and see how far they get socially and personally. The power 
of these fictions are a functional requirement of social organization. Due proc-
ess changes are infrequent.  
 127
Second, in view of these social fictions, predominant data received in field 
work, documents, videos etc. is properline data and vague data and not far 
behind is professionally interpreted data (see GLASER 1998, op cit) The re-
searcher can trust to not get baseline or true data. The researcher will not get 
what is actually going on usually, but will get the properline data on how to see 
it, how to interpret it and how to blur it with vagaries. For the GT researcher 
this is what is going on to maintain current social organization. From this data 
he/she generates an abstract theory to explain action in the substantive area, 
because this kind of data is system maintenance data. I have read many GT 
papers that in arriving at conceptualization of the latent patterns – categories – 
they can show the actuality of goings on by its properlining.  
I will leave to the QDA researchers to decide what kind of accuracy descrip-
tions they will arrive at from these inaccurate forms of data. And I leave it up 
to them whether or not they refer to the incessant, extensive discussion of 
LINCOLN and GUBA to achieve their goal, to wit they say:  
The case study mode lends itself well to the full description that will be re-
quired to encompass all of the facets and make possible understanding on the 
part of a reader judgments about the trustworthiness of such a process, which 
cannot be made with conventional criteria: criteria devised especially for and 
demonstrably appropriate to NI are required (pp.359-360).  
But to toss out these forms of data inaccuracy is a great loss to GT, if it is 
remodeled by NI. Since “all is data” for GT, these data must be used.  
Withstanding the LINCOLN and GUBA scholarly flower talk is not easy for 
GT. NI strictures will crush, bash, coopt and corrupt the innocent GT re-
searcher, who does not yet understand the process of constant modification by 
proliferation of properties of categories using the constant comparative method 
of conceptualization and all the procedures by which it is supported, especially 
conceptual saturation, delimiting and theoretical sampling. NI will ruin a good 
GT by default remodeling. LINCOLN and GUBA foster this outcome by con-
stantly seeding their book with GT jargon and remodeling some GT proce-
dures. NI derails conceptual purpose, with the time wasting of excessive data 
collection, descriptive analysis and the constant myriad of “checks” on accu-
racy, such as audit trails, member checks, logs etc., etc.  
Let me give a brief example of how GT is modified to include more data, 
which apparently makes it look inaccurate, but increases explanatory power. In 
a general theory of cautionary control Barry GIBSON (1996) has generated a 
hypothesis from his dentaling data – the more intensively formulated the rules 
of cautionary control, the greater of the growing deviance from the rules that 
varies by a typology of implementors. If one looks to the operating room one 
can say that the greater the rules of cautionary control the greater the compli-
ance with them, by adding visibility and the strictness of enforcement because 
of dire consequences.  
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So we have the variable of adherence to cautionary rules varying from 
growing deviance to growing compliance. Airport security is somewhere in the 
middle but we need data. We have here exampled the power of modification 
increasing the explanatory power of a GT on cautionary control. Indeed, accu-
racy is moot here: a non-issue and to have applied it would have mushed the 
GT to untrustworthy in contrast to modifications increasing its explanatory 
power.  
NI has put the sociology of worrisome accuracy on the map. Then LIN-
COLN and GUBA took on the self-appointed task to course the route to it: they 
call it trustworthiness. Then they implied by default and by express clarity that 
the research was not worthy of belief without it, so best follow their course! 
Let, I say again, the QDA methodologists stave off this of their routine re-
search. All I can say here is that GT is not immune to this doubt sewing, until 
seen in its pure conceptual light – conceptual theory – and not as another QDA 
method. I am saying to the reader: Do not let NI remodel GT and block pure 
GT research.  
LINCOLN and GUBA in their zeal for accuracy do not realize what data 
truly is, its variable true kind of accuracy for social organization and their dis-
tortion of absolute accuracy. LINCOLN and GUBA do not understand the 
abstract freedom of conceptualization from time, place and people. In advocat-
ing their throttling credibility framework they do not understand the humble 
nature of researchers in the field just trying their best with limited resources. 
Nor do they understand their abuse of consumer’s intelligence and ability to 
judge their complex trustworthiness, to screen descriptions through their cul-
ture and position perspectives and to take things tentatively or under advise-
ment until more data occur. Consumer care is not mentioned once in their book 
and what is the research for, if not for them! GT considers at length all these 
problems.  
Much of this may not be understood by the reader without a thoughtful read-
ing of and a returning referencing to my books: “Theoretical Sensitivity” 
(GLASER 1978), “Doing Grounded Theory” (GLASER 1998) and “The 
Grounded Theory Perspective” (GLASER 2001). I keep trying to pierce, to get 
to essentials and to summarize LINCOLN and GUBA’s massive, detailed, non-
conceptual onslaught. I am sure the reader has my incessant point in mind. To 
continue writing up in this paper the detailed analysis in my memo bank on 
trustworthiness techniques would be too extensive. However in interest of the 
reader, I would return to the same point: leave GT out of NI. GT is not for 
excessive techniques for establishing accuracy of findings, it is not for replic-
able description. It is simply for conceptual theory induction and constant 
modification. It does not require the prolonged fieldwork and culture soaking 
of QDA methods for description and especially the lengthy rigorous techniques 
of assuring credibility offered in NI.  
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QDA researchers and GT researchers do the best they can within their skill 
level. To worry about dishonesty in routine research is an insult to the respon-
sible, honesty level of researchers. They say that member checks, logs and 
auditing prevent researchers from altering data to suit their theory. If altering 
does occur in an isolated case, there is little to protect us against it anyway, 
until corrected by future research, if then. Trust in the researcher is a research 
value that applies absolutely. Of course in GT, unlike NI, there is no temptation 
to alter data to suit theory, since the theory is generated inductively from the 
data. Data is not forced to fit a theory. In GT, theory is not generated based on 
preconceived professional wish and career opportunism.  
GT is always as good as far as it goes and is then modified by constant 
comparison with more data. It produces stable enduring concepts with immense 
grab. For example, the category of pseudo-friending as a form of client control 
is spawning theory extensions in many areas. It is easily generalizable to many 
situations of people control. Categories are reifications with good fit, but still 
can be changed to rename the same latent pattern. Modification not accuracy is 
the issue. I prefer the category of credentializing, others like licensing, degree-
ing, permitting or qualifying, but the pattern is the same.  
4. Mutual Shaping 
LINCOLN and GUBA (1985) write a very erudite chapter on a critique of 
causality. They state: “why scientists have been enamored of the causality 
concept ... if causes are the key to prediction and control, knowledge of causes 
is tantamount to power” (p.129). Their critique of many definitions of causal-
ity: deterministic, linear, necessary, sufficient, multiple, timing is fine. They 
come up with the concept of mutual simultaneous shaping as a replacement. It 
refers to  
everything influences everything else in the here and now. Many elements are 
implicated in any given action, and each element interacts with all of the oth-
ers that change them all, while simultaneously resulting in something that we 
label as outcomes or effects. But the interaction has no directionality, no need 
to produce that particular outcome, it simply happened as a product of the mu-
tual shaping (p.151).  
Thus LINCOLN and GUBA (1985) still keep the preoccupation with causal-
ity, but in their way. In GT we call mutual shaping the interaction of effects; it 
was, originated by LAZARSFELD and used at Columbia University 20 or 
more years before LINCOLN and GUBA’s description. If they had read “Theo-
retical Sensitivity” (GLASER 1978), they would see it as just another theoreti-
cal code. So much for their eruditeness – lacking and selective.  
From the point of view of GT their preoccupation with causality is a pet 
theoretical code for themselves and their referred others. It is forcing the theory 
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that may be integrated by possibly many other theoretical codes. In “Theoreti-
cal Sensitivity” I listed 18 theoretical coding families. In “Doing Grounded 
Theory” (GLASER 1998) I listed some more. There are still more. Which one 
to use in GT is a question of emergence during sorting of memos. Theoretical 
codes must earn their relevance as all variables in GT. Causality, however 
defined, is just one. The most popular one. A frequent pet to some researchers 
is basic social process. Our book on “Awareness of Dying” (GLASER & 
STRAUSS 1967) was built on a typology code that emerged. A recent disserta-
tion I read (BROWN 1996) was based on the binary code. Some coding is just 
a range, a degree or dimensional. It depends. Again I can only warn that NI can 
remodel GT into a search for causality and severely restrict its generation of 
theory.  
Lastly, LINCOLN and GUBA (1985) state that “phenomenon of study, … 
take their meaning as much from contexts as they do from themselves” (p.189, 
italics in original). This, again, is a forcing of a theoretical code for GT, how-
ever well it may work for NI. How a context influences a latent pattern – a 
category – regarding meaning is emergent, not forced. Meaning for GT may 
come from wherever it may be discovered. Contextualizing meaning may or 
may not be relevant for a theory’s explanation of how a main concern is con-
tinually resolved. 
5. Grounded Theory 
LINCOLN and GUBA demoted GT to just a consequence of the more general 
NI paradigm, ostensibly to put it into perspective, but latently to bury as just a 
QDA method that should follow NI. Although they refer to it virtually every-
where in their book, they give it merely four direct pages of discussion. Their 
discussion remodels GT automatically to a descriptive QDA method. They say 
“Grounded Theory, that is theory that follows from data rather than preceding 
them, is a necessary consequence of the naturalistic paradigm that posits multi-
ple realities and makes transferability dependent on local contextual factors” 
(pp.204-205). We obviously had something else, very different in mind when 
codifying GT methodology in “The Discovery of Grounded Theory” 
(GLASER & STRAUSS 1967). The “something else,” which was our purpose 
and paradigm, is so far from NI paradigm that it is not worth spending time on. 
The differences are founded in the contrast between description and conceptu-
alization and run wide and deep.  
LINCOLN and GUBA consider GT as “local” theory, which has a descrip-
tive implication and that is all. All substantive GTs have general implication far 
beyond the more local population used in the research. They are a foundation 
for developing formal theory to follow on the general implications as more data 
is compared into the theory. Also if site spreading theoretical sampling (see 
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GLASER 1998) is used the data goes far beyond local. Actually it is hard to 
restrain generalizing of the concepts of a substantive theory before an emergent 
fit is achieved.  
LINCOLN and GUBA have no skill in handling their cited two attacks on 
GT: 1. “GT is inadequate because it is underdetermined because given a set of 
facts it is always open to multiple interpretation and can be extended indefi-
nitely” (p.207). These are descriptive properties not relevant to conceptualiza-
tion. GT discovers and conceptualizes the latent patterns of what is going on. It 
is always relevant. If a GT is accused as being interpretive, which is probably 
meaningless, it is a very relevant interpretation. I have not seen more that one 
theory emerge at any time in a research. Also as discussed above indefinite 
extension is wrong. GT is bounded by its delimiting properties. But like all 
theory, whether grounded or not, new research can extend it by modification. 
2. “Second, it is argued that Grounded Theory is impossible to devise, because 
the raw data are themselves facts only within the framework of some other 
(perhaps implicit) theory. Thus a theory can only discover itself. That facts are 
“theory-laden seems to be well accepted among epistemologists” (p.207). This 
attack by LINCOLN and GUBA, a tautology, is meaningless and purely de-
structive. It goes nowhere. It makes GT meaningless, since it misses the point 
that GT conceptualizes data, but does not describe it.  
Clearly this short, direct, rather empty treatment of GT combined with the 
prolific use of its jargon throughout their book and remodeling of its proce-
dures in the rest of the book indicates the lack of LINCOLN and GUBA’s 
study of the GT books and their lack of experience in doing GT.  
6. Final Comment 
By now the reader has the idea, so I will stop this analysis of differences that 
could go on for many, many more pages, which could result in a book of con-
tention like my “Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis” (GLASER 1992). At 
every turn LINCOLN and GUBA’s conception of NI co-opts and corrupts NI’s 
use of GT terminology and procedures. It remodels by default GT to just an-
other descriptive QDA method. For GT, constructionism and value-free are just 
more variables in the data, causality which they call mutual shaping is just 
another theoretical code which may or may not emerge to integrate the descrip-
tion or conceptualization. “The only generalization is that there is no generali-
zation,” LINCOLN and GUBA say in their Chapter 5 (p.110), which is both 
trite and an admission that generalization is very difficult to establish in QDA. 
For GT conceptual generalization is easy and frequent. “Establishing trustwor-
thiness” (Chapter 11) takes credibility to an extreme degree – auditing and 
member checking – and none of their positions apply to GT (see above on 
credibility).  
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While a worthy QDA method, NI cannot be allowed to remodel GT at every 
turn. Under the guise of detailed, incessant scholar affirmations, LINCOLN 
and GUBA have co-opted, corrupted, mauled and mugged GT for their own 
purposes without any experience in actually doing a GT as originated. The 
genuine “grab” of GT – the idea and the terminology – has made its use quite 
productive to some and highly exploitable by others.  
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